

Logic, Morals and Meditation: *tarka, dharma, yoga*

“I will now close my eyes, plug my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will rid my thoughts of physical objects — or, since that is beyond me, I shall write those images off as empty illusions. Talking with myself and looking more deeply into myself, I’ll try gradually to know myself better.”

Don’t these lines sound as if they are from some sort of an autobiography of a Yogi ? Actually, as many of us recognize, they are the opening lines of Descartes’ Third *Meditation (on First Philosophy)*. The coincidence becomes even more intriguing when one reads on the rest of Descartes’ chapter. One of the alternative objects of meditation recommended by Patañjali in his *Yoga-Sūtra-s* is the idea of God— not quite a Christian creator God but a unique center of consciousness, free from the bondage of karma and desires and afflictions, where the seed of omniscience reaches its highest conceivable perfection. This third Meditation of Descartes also happens to focus on the concept of God, though a radically different concept than the one recommended by Patañjali. Yet, it would be shocking to both Western rationalist-modernists as well as to Eastern lovers of mystical wisdom to call Descartes an unwitting practitioner of Yoga ! Descartes was a mathematician posing as a sceptic in his search for perfect certainty through purely logical reasoning and thereby laying the foundations of European Scientific Epistemology. What does that have to do with Eastern spirituality which is supposed to help us transcend all logical thinking and plunge us in an oceanic intuitive experience of God, self or nothingness ?

Nevertheless, the autobiographical account of how Descartes is preparing himself, after having stumbled upon the existence of the first person, for further philosophical discoveries sounds uncannily yogic. Indeed, that description of withdrawal from all the external senses seems to echo *Bhagavadgītā* VIII, verse 12:

*“ sarvadvārāṇi samyamya, mano hṛdi nīrūdhya ca,
mūrdhnyādhāyātmanah prāṇam āsthito yoga-dhāraṇām”*

“Having restrained all the doors of one’s body, and arresting the mind in one’s heart, one practices the Yoga of steadfast concentration by gathering the entire vital force on the top of the cranium”. A similar resemblance between the two traditions can be noticed with regard to the description of an ideal moral agent. When in the VI-th

chapter of the *Gītā*, an ideal Yogi(n) is defined as one who looks upon others' pleasures and pains in analogy with his own pleasures and pains and sees everyone as equal, seeing everyone in his self and his self in everyone else, that description seems to correspond with Adam Smith's description of sympathy as the most important moral sentiment: "By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him..." And yet, the popular image of Yoga meditation, with all its emphasis on special postures and breathing techniques and levels of inward one-point focusing of the mind, with a certain kind of tranquility as their goal, has little to do with being fair or just in one's social conduct or empathizing with or trying to alleviate the suffering of others around us. Yoga seems to be as amoral as it is anti-analytic or a-rational. But is it? The chief purpose of this paper is to investigate whether this popular image is correct, to inquire what exactly is the relation between yogic meditation, logical discursive thinking or reasoning and practical moral virtues.

My sense is that these three aspects of human perfection, so to say, somehow hang together. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha*— a massive 9th Sanskrit text originally called "The Way to Liberation" (*Mokṣopāya*) vividly describes the co-presence of these three kinds of virtues in the ideal spiritually free-in-this-life person. Having achieved perfect tranquility of mind (literally having gone beyond the fluctuations of the mind simply through philosophical reasoning with oneself—being an out and out intellectual text, YV looks down upon bodily or psychic yoga through breath-control etc.)

"The living liberated person laughs at the ways of the world, finding its pleasures insipid in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. Yet he does have fun in this world, which he makes fun of. He avoids the extremes of anxiety or complacency in crises, he remains neutral between mutual enemies, he is always kind and generous. The hectic affairs of his daily life do not exhaust him. Outwardly he remains busy with a lot of initiatives in which he is efficient but at heart he is quiet and restful without any burning desires. He is polished, sweet-tempered, altruistic, and smiles before he talks. He is brave in battles and enjoys himself and entertains others with fresh sports, fun and games. He usually has mastery over many special sciences and is respected for his skill in debates and dialogues".

Of course this is too perfect to be actual. But the drift is clear: spiritual or broadly Yogic perfection is supposed to make the philosopher socially urbane, ethically virtuous and also intellectually sharper. But how? What is the connection between spiritual practice of inwardness and tranquility, moral character, and logical acumen ?

Let me start by setting up a robust opposition which says there is no connection whatsoever between them . The following types of considerations could be adduced in support of a claim of a complete disconnect between Yoga on the one hand and analytical logical acumen or ethical excellence on the other:

Some people meditate regularly but are not very moral. Quite a lot of people display exemplary moral virtues in their lives but have no time for practicing meditation. From these facts we can conclude that meditation has nothing to do with morality, that calming the fluctuations of the mind through contemplative practice is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a good human being or doing the right thing.

Similarly, lots of very clever , analytically rational and theoretically knowledgeable people show no inclination to meditate. And many who are good at arresting the flow of their wavy minds by meditation seem to be bad reasoners and averse to analytical thinking. Such failures of correlation show that meditation has nothing to do with logical acumen or rational thinking and that it would be a bad pun to take Descartes' choice of the title: *Meditations on First Philosophy* as a kind of concession to spiritual practice.

Perhaps the best positive case we can make for the practice of Yoga, if we concede that meditation has no impact on moral character and demands little reasoning or conceptual abilities, is that it helps us deal with our emotions. But how could we live with such a tritely tripartite picture of human nature where thinking and doing are so insulated from feeling that an emotionally balanced quiet Yoga-adept could easily be intellectually dim or ethically debased? Even if in Hindu, Buddhist or Sufi religious imagination and hageography one finds some “holy fool” type living liberated characters who are so far beyond good and evil that they live like drunken dim-wit drop-outs, the standard purpose of Yoga surely is not to become such irresponsible citizens as Vimalakīrti or some Tantric bum! Even if contemplative poise is not a sufficient condition for good conduct, at least it must be a necessary condition for intellectual virtues such as knowledge and rationality. Otherwise the basic assumption of Yoga metaphysics of the mind would be false. Because, Yoga looks upon an afflicted state of the nature-constitutive feelings of pleasure, pain and torpor as the cause of theoretical ignorance or logical confusion, an ill-balanced affective life to be the cause of greed , hate, violence , cruelty or egotism in public social life. Unless Yoga philosophical psychology is fundamentally mistaken, how can people have clear and correct ideas and beliefs about themselves and the world while “the turbulent rivers of their minds flow towards evil” ?

I shall try to answer these questions by looking at the place of logical reasoning and ethical conduct in the

life of an ideal meditator, as recommended by Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Māhāyana Buddhism, and Kāshmir Shaivism.

But I shall also question the general line of thinking which draws conclusions about (lack of) correlation from real-life statistics, by looking at the fate of the purported unity of moral and intellectual virtues. By unity I don't mean strict identity or reducibility: to claim that not doing to others what one resents when it is done to oneself requires clear conceptual thinking is not to say that fairness in practice is nothing but clear thinking ! The unity between cognitive clarity and just conduct consists in the former creating the enabling conditions for the latter. Let us forget about Yoga or meditation, for a moment. Let us look at the direct correlation between cognitive rationality and ethical perfection. It is also a fact that many obviously moral people seem to be logically dim and many gifted logicians turn out to be ethically derelict, in spite of which Western philosophers who recognize these facts still find the view that intellectual and moral virtues go together quite convincing.

What I am trying to say by drawing attention to this last pair of correlation-failures between cognitive and moral merit is this. Convinced by Plato, Aquinas, or Spinoza, some thinkers assume, *in theory*, that knowledge and logically circumspect thinking about oneself and one's environment are necessary and conducive — note that I am not saying sufficient — conditions for the practice of moral virtues. They would find it upsetting that each of these features seem to be easily available in actual people well without the other — that there are stupid saints as well as intelligent rascals. In a similar way, someone like me, who assumes that Yogic meditation is helped by and helps sound rational judgement as well as virtuous conduct, would find it deeply embarrassing that there are so many meditating nincompoops, non-meditating smart intellectuals, virtuous non-yogis and rogues who practice yoga regularly. But the embarrassment should not lead to jettisoning the textually endorsed and conceptually intelligible idea that Yoga -meditation requires and ensures ethical alertness, clarity of rational analytical thinking as well as mindful management of emotions, just as even a large number of well-behaved fools and knowledgeable crooks would not quite refute the claim that knowledge and virtue are closely connected. Perhaps what Kant called the “crooked timber” of human nature is indeed so gnarled and knotted that no straight entailment thesis cannot be defended, perhaps a certain sort of spiritual contemplativeness, in some cases and to some extent, can co-exist with paucity of intellectual and ethical virtues, while moral and logical excellence do not automatically entail spiritual depth! It would still not follow that spirituality or Yoga is *incompatible* with analytical acumen , much less that a morally virtuous person should be unable or unwilling to meditate! But mere compatibility is not even a weak

version of unity !

A text like *Bhagavadgītā*, while being quite open to the idea of many alternative forms of Yoga or alternative paths to being good or wise—some more cognitive, some more action-oriented, some more emotional—seems to uphold a moderate unity thesis by claiming: that pure knowledge firming up by practice of friendliness, compassion, sincerity and self-control leads to the highest Yogic tranquility, that Yoga is skill in action, that emotional equanimity as well as a moral equality in one’s treatment of others naturally flow from Yoga, and that discursive even metaphysical wisdom (*jñāna*) and intelligence (*buddhi*) are the secret of moral as well as spiritual perfection. How can one defend such a unity thesis in the face of such glaring failures of correlation ?

Of course, there is one rather easy way out of this conundrum. Whenever the concomitance fails one could claim that one of those terms is not genuinely present. The allegedly seasoned Yoga practitioner who shows cruelty or corruption in actual social conduct, one could insist, is not properly practicing Yoga. Or, more daringly, one could insist that an apparent absence of yogic contemplation is not a real absence. The life of the spiritually un-inclined intellectual who seems to be so brilliant in his scientific enquiry is not really devoid of Yoga, one may say. Samadhi of one sort or other, after all, is a property of all states of the mind. (*Yogabhāṣya* 1.2). Even a Cārvāka thinker such as Daniel Dennett when he focuses on what he is going to write in his next book goes through a short-lived *samādhi* state. Even he meditates, although he may not call it that. This line of defense of the connection thesis is seductive but it smells of circularity. We seem to be stipulatively defining the three kinds of excellences in such a way that the “discovery” that one cannot flourish without the other becomes an analytic claim.

A STRONG UNITY-OF-VIRTUES THESIS

Strong supporters of the unity of intellectual and moral virtues have quite openly taken this circular-sounding tack when faced with glaring cases of dis-unity: Rational wisdom and practical virtuousness must go together because when one is found without the other, it is not a genuine case of wisdom or virtue. A certain head of a powerful state may seem to be very shrewd and very blood-thirsty at the same time. But his worldly shrewdness and reasonableness, one can insist, is a veneer underneath which lies a moronic lack of imagination (an inability to put himself in the victim’s position, for instance) which makes him so ethically challenged. A totalitarian or terrorist who urges his people to kill enemies of his religion may sound very pious, look very saintly, or act super-intelligent, having mastery over the latest technology for mass-destruction or mass-brain-washing. But he is neither

wise nor pious, and I would say that he does not qualify to even enter a class called “Meditation 101”, even if he spends a lot of time praying in his own temple. The idea of emotional intelligence helps us diagnose such glaring cases of clever thugs, as cases of lack of intelligence, after all. This, incidentally, is a rather steep requirement, which would disqualify not only a short-tempered Schopenhauer but most of us academic types who profess to possess cognitive skills of one kind or another. Socrates, Spinoza and the *Mahābhārata* would quite openly use such harsh standards, rejecting the erudition, eloquence and brilliance of those of us who passionately cling to our views and reputations and are easily crushed by personal calamities and easily bribed by accolade, as knowledge improperly so called. They would have no use for *techne* or even *episteme* which fails to result in *arete* and *phronesis*.

The contemporary epistemologist Linda Zagzebski, in her book *Virtues of the Mind*, puts forward such a unity thesis: “There are both logical and causal connections between moral and intellectual virtues that are just as extensive and profound as the connections among various moral virtues” (p 158). She shows how logically the moral quality of honesty entails, through careful preservation of truth and justification of what one tells others, the intellectual qualities of perceptual acuteness and judicious weighing of evidence. She also tries to demonstrate that causally moral failings such as excessive pride, envy and desire for power can get in the way of epistemic virtues such as detecting one’s own errors and facing the consequences of one’s own views. The pugnacity and egotism with which many scientists and professional philosophers cling on to their own positions, often refusing to see evidence to the contrary, shows how lack of spiritual training in non-clinging has slowed down the progress of science.

The reason this is relevant in the present context is that one can easily find such close logical and causal connections between the requisite qualifications of Yogic Meditativeness and intellectual and ethical excellences. If, after remaining frozen in a trance like transcendental meditation for a couple of days or meditating routinely on Brahman, Allah, God or Emptiness, a religious person shows signs of idiocy, irrationality, incoherent and confused thinking or emerges as a suicide bomber or a serial killer with some allegedly celestial commandment to exterminate in order to liberate, or starts selling his own meditation-technique as an efficient marketing mantra, we could safely say that such concentration or spiritual experience is not Yoga, because it is not supported by good reasoning and does not result in non-violence and non-acquisitiveness, in *ahimsā* and *aparigraha*. *The Yoga-bhāṣya* clearly

connects non-violence (a virtue of the heart, as it were) with truthfulness and trustworthiness (more epistemic virtues) by the following remark:

“If you speak and think just as you have perceived, just as you have reasoned for yourself, just as you have heard from reliable sources, if your words are uttered with the intention of transmitting in others the understanding or knowledge that you have yourself achieved, if your statements are not deceptive, nor erroneous, nor communicatively vacuous (by being unintelligible or tautologous), then you may be called a truthful person. Also the whole purpose of speaking should be the good of all living beings, as far as possible, and not harming another living being.

Even when spoken with such good intentions if your speech hurts and harms others then that will not count as truth-telling even if it is literally stating the facts as they are” (YSB II/30). *Mahābhārata* goes to an extreme trying to enrich the epistemic notion of truth by building in thirteen other connected virtues to it, and these include focused steadiness of mind or a peaceful contemplative disposition. So the integration that I am trying to argue for is attempted solely by a very rich notion of truthfulness and sincerity in the 12th Canto of the *Mahābhārata*.

(Incidentally Bernard Williams in his recent book called *Truth and Truthfulness* (Princeton University Press 2002) especially chapters 5 and 8 on Truth’s relationship to Sincerity and Authenticity—sets himself a similar agenda,—which I take to be a healthy antidote to the dismissive minimalism and deflationism regarding the concept of truth).

The thirteen virtues are: Equanimity or equity, self-control, non-jealousy, forgiveness, a positive cheerful attitude tempered by shame (if one slips), forbearance, non-maliciousness, renunciation, meditative concentration (*dhyānam*), a detached civil dignity, patience, kindness and non-injury. So, all those jealous hardhearted people who speak the plain truth in order to teach some one a lesson, all those promise-keepers who are ready to kill their neighbors simply because they had made a foolishly revengeful promise, all those restless distracted gossips who are ready to tattle because they cannot wait to see the excitement or the suffering that will follow, are, by these criteria, *not telling the truth*. Even in *Nyāya Varttika* (1.1.7) Uddyotakara while defining the testimony of a knowledge-possessing true-believer as a source of **knowledge at second hand** says that the hearer would not have the appropriate epistemic warrant unless the trustworthy speaker—(āpta) tells things as they are by being moved by compassion for others. The Kashmir Shaiva author Utpaladeva opens his own gloss on his cryptic verses on “Recognition-of-God in Subjective Consciousness” with these beautiful lines :” Why did I write this treatise ? I had

to write it because I had to share my knowledge with other people. Why did I have to share my knowledge with other people ? Because I was ashamed of enjoying alone the treasure of wisdom which has been given to me as a gift and I wanted other people to benefit from it too”. Just as kindness can lead to speaking out what you know, fearlessness or courage can also lead to speaking out. The sincerity with which the ancient Indian woman philosopher Gargi speaks up in a male dominated assembly where she was once shut up rather rudely is recorded in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. In spite of being threatened by the main speaker that she is crossing her limits and may die if she asks more questions, she asks the most spiritually profound and trenchant pair of questions which brings out the deepest metaphysical truth about the self from *Yajñavalkya*, her formidable interlocutor. Her truthful dare epitomizes, for me, all three characteristics of intellectual honesty, moral courage and Yogic equanimity which comes out of winning over fear of death.

LOGIC AND YOGA

Yoga practice, we must not forget, is squarely based on Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge. Sāṃkhya recognizes three sources of knowledge: Perception, Scriptural authority, and Inference. But it rejects, in so many words, the possibility that the first or the second, sensory perception or Vedic or any other kind of testimony would show us the way to complete cessation of suffering. What is left then ? Contrary to popular expectation, Sāṃkhya does **not** bring in extrasensory perception at all. No experience can give us liberatory knowledge .What kind of knowledge of the difference between the manifest (*vyakta*) manifold of the effects and their unmanifest (*avyakta*) cause on the one hand and pure consciousness (*jñā*) on the other can liberate us, permanently and exhaustively from all kinds of suffering ? Well, it has to be knowledge by reasoning or inference. That is Sāṃkhya's official answer. And Yoga does not depart from this in spirit, in so far as *samādhi* or concentration-states are first described as “with rational discrimination”, “with inner argumentation” and then only proceeds to the non-conceptual highest states. The centrality of logical reasoning in Yoga practice is clearly enunciated in the pre-Patañjali (most likely Pre-Buddhist) ancient text *Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad*. It speaks of **six** instead of eight limbs of Yoga. These are: Breathing exercises (*prāṇāyāma*)

Withdrawal of the senses (*pratyāhāra*)

Meditation (*dhyāna*)

One-tipped holding of the mind on an object (*dhāraṇā*)

* Inward reasoning (*tarka*)*

Stilling the flow of the mind (*samādhi*).

Indeed, this *Upaniṣad* says that the ultimate experience of Brahman is attained through reasoning alone: “Having fully arrested the outward flow of speech-mind-and vital energy, one **sees** Brahman **with reasoning**” (*brahma tarkeṇa paśyati!*)”

Similar importance is given to reasoning in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition of meditation as well. Refuting common misconceptions about meditation, Tsong Khapa responds to two anti-intellectualist qualms with characteristic vigor. The first misconception: “When meditating on the path to Buddhahood, one should not do repeated analysis with discerning wisdom. Such analysis is only useful at the level of preparatory studies”. Tsong Khapa responds : “ This is nonsensical chatter of someone who is utterly ignorant of the crucial points of practice. First study with someone what you intend to practice and come to know it secondhand. Next use scripture and reasoning to properly reflect on the meaning of what you studied, coming to know it first hand. Thus you need both repeated analytical meditation and nonanalytical stabilizing meditation (*shamataa* and *vipassanaa*)”. Again TsongKhapa warns us : “ Not knowing this system, some even propound, ‘If you are a scholar , you only do analytical meditation. If you are a spiritual seeker or adept you only do stabilizing meditation.’ This is not the case, because each must do both. . . . you must use discernment for both of these methods of meditation. If you lack or are deficient in such analytical meditation, then you will not develop stainless wisdom, the precious life of the path.” (*The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, or Lam-Rim by TsongKhapa*, translated by Cutler and Newland et al SnowLion Publications Ithaca 2000)

YOGA AND MORAL VIRTUES

Not only are the positive and negative virtues of *Yama* and *Niyama* relevant as initial qualifying conditions of Yoga practice, constant self-vigilance about non-injury to other living beings, truth and non-covetousness and sexual continence is all along important, since as long as one has a human body one can expect to feel the inner enemies of lust, desire, anger and egotism. Even the living liberated person normally behaves in a virtuous way, albeit effortlessly. So, ethical conduct accompanies Yoga practice at the start, in the middle and at the end. There is an intricate rhythm of mutual support and safeguarding through which these moral virtues work in unison. Truthfulness works only when tempered with compassion, as we have already shown above. Compassion without

analytical reasoning and the regular practice of self-criticism would turn into self-indulgent sentimentalism. Non-acquisitiveness and vigilance against greed are needed to protect the meditator from using her spirituality as a ruse for gathering fame or fortune. Why then do we see so many alleged Yoga practitioners living or at least occasionally behaving in ethically deplorable ways ? Well, the answer, I am afraid, has to be that there are too many imposters, fakes and self-deluded claimants of Yoga-expertise. Partial development of only one aspect of the Yoga practice to the neglect of others leads to such fake Gurudom or what Kant called Sensation-Dreamers and Reason-Dreamers! (See *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer by Immanuel Kant*)

After divulging to the insistent Naciketas, the mystery of the deathless self which can only be ‘realized’ by a lucky few, Death , in The *Katha Upaniṣad* warns, “ No one who has not desisted from wrong actions, has not become calm, has not arrested one’s mind, can recognize the true nature of the self, only by proper wisdom can the state of freedom be attained” Krishna says very categorically: For a person who does not have self-control, Yoga would be hard to attain (*asamyatatmana yogo dusprapa iti me matih*). With a facile appeal to the popular but ill-understood notion of “transcending all morality” , a large number of Yoga teachers practice and preach licentious corrupt behavior. Any one who has to practice Truth or *Ahimsā* in their full form would need to concentrate dispassionately on evidence with pure devotion to truth and give up greed. Yoga without constant striving for minimizing violence and acquisitiveness is a farce.

CONCLUDING UN-ORTHODOX CONFESSION

When I am torn between two incompatible philosophical positions, such as a direct realism about the external world and a subjective idealism, or between hard determinism and libertarianism about the future, or between a substantial eternal self and a mere set and series of loosely connected ephemeral psycho-physical states, as I clearly and distinctly feel the force of the arguments and counter-arguments on either side I sometimes feel like Wittgenstein did, that the problem must be spurious and both sides must be somehow trapped by language. But at other times I feel a profound sense of perfect equipoise and an epoche which enables me to occupy as it were that middle ground between the two cognitive armies where I become ready to listen to an almost celestial song in a middle voice. For a few moments, during these rare transformations of philosophical dilemmas into a literally breath-taking opening up of a space where pure awareness self-savors awareness, I seem to be in no rush to take any one side. I viscerally feel the connection between breath and mind, or to be precise, between no-mind and no-

breath. The alternation of a perfectly indecisive intellect turns into the playful freedom to choose between optional ways of world-making. From the opening line of the *Nasadiya Hymn* or *RgVeda* to the opening line of Nāgārjuna's MMK, the exclusion of both logical extremes or even of their denials does not leave room for any admissible ontological thesis in the logical space but it does not therefore exclude a middle. The middle between such affirmations and negations is somehow mysteriously connected to the middle between in-breathing and out-breathing, that hair-line gap between one wave of cognition and another that the Tantric Agama-s talk about. This secret middle point is felt as the phenomenological heart of pure objectless subjective but egoless consciousness. This makes good sense of *Nāgārjuna's* identification of emptiness with the middle place, of the use of the Sanskrit word *vīmarśa* for the most intimate unique freedom-entailing feature of consciousness in Abhinavagupta's thought as well as its use for a pendulous doubting awareness in Nyāya. Questioning, doubting, debating are thus felt by me, in those moments, to be continuous with the act of meditation. I begin to see a trans-historical significance in the fact that Descartes had to go through the sceptical cleansing before regaining epistemic access to the self and the perfect Being, though he slipped back into metaphysical egotism. Sincere engagement with rational two-sided reasoning headed for an ego-shattering stalemate constitutes a path to that viewless nowhere where nondual sentience can stay free. It can playfully and compassionately look back at its own silly attachments wondering, as a woken up person does, how on earth I could think I was someone looking at other things and thinkers? I confess that whenever I have this experience for a few brief moments, I am tempted to think that I am beginning to understand what Abhinavagupta meant when he wrote in *Tantrāloka*.VI, 9—13, “That pure sentience whose ultimate essence consists in the sheer light of awareness, when it gives up the roles of the object known and of the ego knowing it, shines all by itself as the clear sky. This pure sentience is called the empty form of consciousness which is the final stage that the Yogins attain through their reflective discursive cogitations of the form : ‘not this, not this’”.

This open empty space-like consciousness itself takes the form of the vital force called “*prāṇa*” and creates the vibrating waves of thrill in the body, surges up as the inner drive of the will and is known by such various names as : “vibration”, “efflorescence of creativity” “tranquil repose” “the living being” “the genius in the heart” (*pratibha*). Of course, this state does not last. I feel compelled to leave the middle and take up a definite position (as Descartes did), defend it with conviction which brings attachment, call that “my view”, my lineage, my culture, my

discovery etc. Thus I am back into the entire package of egotistical living. But I have an optimistic feeling that if I could somehow keep practicing, to the best of my ability---and this is where Dharma comes in as a glue between Tarka and Yoga--- the virtues of non-injury, candor, non-acquisitiveness, friendship, compassion, rejoicing at other's success, cheerfulness, indifference towards others' moral failings, then the integration between my analytical rational equipoise and my moral mindfulness would together gel into a more permanent disposition towards a contemplative calm. Such a peaceful inwardly vigilant and outwardly unattached disposition may enable me to witness this wonderful sport of the plural world of much pain and some pleasure while being right in the middle of it. Such integration of logic and meditation can happen, I believe, only if the bridge of unflagging moral mindfulness is cultivated. It is because I lack proper practice of *Yama* and *Niyama* that these ecstatic transformations of philosophical analysis into contemplative stillness do not stabilize in me. If some day I ever come closer to the hardest achievement in this integration program: the internalization of the moral virtues, I shall be able to tell you exactly what morality has to do with spiritual salvation. Or better, you will have to guess just by watching me act, because I shall stop talking about it.